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DETERMINANTS OF TRANSFORMATION AND
COMMERCIALIZATION OF MFIs: NONEXPERIMENTAL FINDINGS
Debadutta K u m a r P a n d a *

Abstract
This study was carried out to understand the social performance of deposit taking
and deposit non-taking MFIs, the determinants of MFIs 'personnel size and their
predictions, the possible determinants of women borrowers of MFIs and their
consequences, and the determinants of the transformation of MFIs from deposit nontaking to deposit taking. For this study, a sample size of 90 MFIs i.e. 10 MFIs each from 9
countries, were randomly selected from the MIX Market data set. Descriptive statistics
and econometric models were engaged in the study It was found out that the MFIs staff
strength is positively and significantly related with the size of active borrowers. The
numbers of women borrowers in MFIs are significantly and positively determined by
external borrowings of MFIs and their gross loan portfolio. The probability of
transformation of MFIs from non- deposit taking to deposit taking is significantly
determined by loan portfolio, borrowings, assets and number of active borrowers of
MFIs.

INTRODUCTION
Microfmance Institutions (MFIs) are the financial intermediaries who
intermediate by accessing finance from the financial wholesalers or donors, and
provide the microfinance to the poor and unbankables. These MFIs behave like
financial retailers for the clients. MFIs are either regulated or non-regulated entities,
subjected to their respective national laws. The sector-wise discussions divide the
entire MFIs into three sectors i.e. (i) formal sector including conmiercial banks,
postal saving banks and non banking financial institutions, (ii) semi-formal sectors
including NGOs and registered thrift and credit associations or societies or
cooperatives and (iii) non-formal sectors including unregistered thrift and credit
groups like, village banks, community banks, rotating savings and credit
associations, self-help groups, credit unions, money lenders etc. (Ledgerwood,
1999). The prudential regulations of many countries are not subjected and applicable
to NGO-based MFIs, hence they remain out of many microfinance operations. The
NGO-based MFIs, not being licensed from their national governments, imable to
mobilize public savings, hence mostly depend on external sources of money for their
operations (Panda, 2009). The extemal funding pumped into MFIs by development
donors often cultivates an unprofessional culture by introducing the flexible
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operational system, leading to higher transaction cost and willful defaults. Many a
time, the over-dependency of the NGO-based MFIs leads to unsustainable
institutions.
There are a number of factors which trigger up the transformation and
commercialization of MFIs. Under the transformation process, the non-profit and
deposit non-taking MFIs are transforming themselves into for-profit and deposit
taldng MFIs. Also access to capital for not-for profit NGO-MFIs is becoming an
issue since the venture capitalists and financial wholesalers don't find these MFIs
trustworthy due to their modus operandi and legal and ownership structure
(Dieckmann, 2008; Lauer, 2008; Tulchin, 2004).
Often the development assistance on development lending was questioned
(Ellerman, 2007), hence demanded sustainable transformed MFIs who can do the job
commercially. Past experiences reveal that the securitization deals between financial
wholesalers and transformed MFIs helped the MFIs in accessing capital and
transforming risk factors to the banks or the financial wholesalers (Panda, 2009;
Mohanty and Panda, 2007). These securitization deals are not found possible for
NGO-MFIs due to their legal forms.
Past experiences, even though limited, teach us the positive consequences of
transformation and commercialization of MFIs in maintaining transparency,
sustainability, financial performance and social performance (Arianto, 2004). The
transformed and commercially operated MFIs were also questioned for the mission
drift, and their inability in aligning social and commercial performances
(Armendariz and Szafarz, 2009). The commercial orientations pull MFIs to profit
making motives and access the affluent clients leaving out poor imbankbles (Aubert
et al., 2008). Olivares-Polanco (2005) in Latin America observed the existence of
trade-off between the profitability and poverty-depth of outreach of MFIs. Similarly,
Smec et al. (2008) observed that the formal MFIs were transparent and professional,
but less accessible to the suffering poor. More professional management and
operations led MFIs to include costly professional staff, thereby removing the
socially motivated old staff members. It has been observed that scaling up and
making profit became the sole motive for MFIs (Rhyne, 1998), especially the
transformed MFIs. The increased costly professionals and over customization of
products and staff incentivized delivery mechanisms led to more transaction cost for
MFIs (McKim and Hugart, 2005). Therefore MFIs increase interest rates on lending
(Ghate, 2007). There were also negative impacts of these commercialized operations
of large MFIs on smaller MFIs as the large MFIs gradually eat away the small ones
(Rhyne and Christen) due to their higher impact and effectiveness resulting firom
higher scale of operations and cost-efficiency. However, studies in India found out
that the transformation of MFIs does not affect the poor in a big way; rather it leads to
better services and competitive market (Sriram, 2010). Fjigu (2009) studied the
Ethiopian MFIs and observed that the large and medium MFIs were good in
profitability and sustainability, but poor performers in serving women borrowers.
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A limited number of studies were conducted to capture the reasons behind the
transformation of MFIs in many countries, and ahnost all the studies were conducted
in case-study approach pertaining to particular MFIs. Again these studies were
qualitative in nature, hence found difficult in generalization and universal
application. Development professional across countries including Yunus (2007)
cited evidences against the mission drift of MFIs as a result of commercialization and
transformation. So, this quantitative study is conducted to understand on a broad
sense the determinants of transformation of MFIs. Also this study inquires the impact
of commercialization and transformation of MFIs on clients, and whether the MFIs
imdergo mission drift or whether they are able to sustain the double bottom line of
sustainability and development. The particular objectives of this study were (i) to
examine and compare the social performance of deposit taking and deposit nontaking MFIs, (ii) determinants of MFIs personnel and their predictions, (iii)
determinants of women borrowers of MFIs and their consequences, (iv) and the
determinants of the transformation of MFIs from deposit non-taking to deposit
taking.
METHODOLOGY
This study was broadly conducted by accessing the information on MFIs from
Mix-Market. A random selection of 90 MFIs from 9 coimtries was made from the
Mix-Market data-set. From each country, 10 MFIs were randomly selected. The 9
countries selected for the study were Indonesia, India, Bangladesh, Peru,
Philippines, Ecuador, Costa Rica, Mexico and Nicaragua. Information on different
variables i.e. Assets, Gross Loan Portfolio, Equity, Deposits, Borrowings, Personnel,
Active Borrowers, Women Borrowers and Depositors of MFIs were collected and
included in the analysis. Descriptive statistics and econometric tools were used for
data analysis.
To understand the determinants of personnel size in MFIs, an Ordinary Least
Square (OLS) technique with maximimi likelihood estimation was used (Seale,
1990; Pitt and Lee, 1981; and Aigner et al., 1977). So the relationship is transformed
in the form of a regression equation,
P. = f(L,,MF.,A„W„D,B,DJ,
Where,
P, = Personnel size (numbers)
L = Gross Loan portfolio (USD)
Ab= Active borrowers (numbers)
Number of Women borrower
D= Deposits (USD)
B= Borrowings (USD)
D,= Depositors (numbers)
MF,= Type of MFIs; dimmiy variable, 1 if deposit taking and, 0 if deposit not taking
Jaipuria Institute of Management Lucknow
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In the above equation, due to existence of multi-collinearity among the dependent
variables, the equation is transformed into,
P. = f(L,,MF.,A,)
Finally the equation was constructed as,
=C+
Afc + pmft MF,+
+u

equation 1, where

C= Constant
prt = Coefficient of Ab
pmft = Coefficient of MFt
P^, = Coefficient of Lp
u= Random disturbance term
It was hypothesized that number of women borrowers of an MFI is a function
of a set of independent variables i.e., (i) gross loan portfolio, (ii) deposits, (iii)
borrowings, (iv) type of MFIs, and (v) personnel. So, an OLS test was made to arrive
at the impact of independent variables on the dependent variable. Again due to
existence of multi-collinearity among the dependent variables, the equation was
transformed into,
Wb= f( Lp, B), which was finally constructed as,
Wfc= C +P^,Lp + pbB+ u

equation 2, where

C= Constant
Wfc= Number of Women borrower
Lp= Gross Loan portfolio (USD)
B= Borrowings ^ S D )
P^, = Coefficient of Lp
Pb = Coefficient of B
u= Random disturbance term
To understand the determinants and the impacts on the probability of
transformation of MFIs i.e. from non-deposit taking to deposit taking, the Probit
model was engaged. The dependent variable "type of MFI" is converted in to a
dichotomous dummy variable taking binary value i.e. 1 if deposit taking, and 0
otherwise. The Probit model was selected for its suitability in application (Bogan et
al., 2007). Initially the Probit equation was formed as, P ^ = C + p^,Lp + P^B + P^A, +
PwbWb + u. But due multiple correlations among the dependent variables, the Probit
relationship is transformed into two equations;
= C + p^,Lp + pbB + pwbWb + u
P ^ = C + P.A + p^B +
+u

Jaipuria Institute of Management Lucknow
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P ^ Probability of a deposit taking MFI
C= Constant
Lp= Gross Loan portfolio (USD)
B= Borrowings ^ S D )
Wb= Number of Women borrowers
A= Assets of MFI (USD)
Ab= Active borrowers (numbers)
Coefficient of L^
Pfc= Coefficient of B
Coefficient of Wb
P = Coefficient of A
prt= Coefficient of A^
FINDINGS
Data presented in Table-1 represent the various financial parameters of MFIs
across different countries. The average assets position of MFIs in different countries
was USD 575,35,604.74 with the highest of USD 1728,96,642.8 in Mexico and the
lowest of USD 10,92,765.7 in Indonesia. Similar trend was found in case of equity
where Mexico topped while Indonesia was at the bottom. From Table-2, it can again
be observed that the equity as a percentage of assets remained more or less similar in
MFIs across countries, and varied between 10 per cent and 40 per cent. Unlike the
first case, the equity as a percentage of assets was the highest for MFIs in Costa Rica
followed by Indonesia, Philippines, Peru, Nicaragua, Ecuador, Mexico, Bangladesh
and India respectively. Even though MFIs in Indonesia had comparatively less assets
and equity, they left behind MFIs in other countries when equity as a percentage of
assets was measiu-ed. In India, the equity as a percentage of assets was foimd to be the
least as most of the MFIs who were supported by donors with subsidized fimding and
infi-astructure support. The other reason behind this issue could be the commercial
capital support from other agencies including ftmding institutions and venture
capitalists. However on an average, MFIs across the coimtries registered the equity
which was 15.40 per cent ofthe MFI's asset.
The gross loan portfolio was found to be the highest for MFIs in Mexico with
USD 1220, 67, 279.7 and was the least for Indonesia with USD 7, 28, 322.1. The
average gross loan portfolio of MFIs across these 9 countries was USD 42303899.06.
The average gross loan portfolio depends upon the scale of operations and outreach.
MFIs having higher assets seem to have higher gross loan portfolio as evident from
Table-1. The correlation coefficient between assets and gross loan portfolio was 0.99,
which again proves that the MFIs gross loan portfolio increased and/or decreased
with assets position. From Table-2, it can be observed that the gross loan portfolio as
a percentage of assets was the highest for MFIs in Costa Rica (84.24 %) and the least
for Indonesia (66.64 %). However, it can be understood that the gross loan portfolio
of MFIs was about 73.53 per cent of the MFIs' assets.
Jaipuria Institute of Management Lucknow
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In the sample study, all the MFIs were not deposit taking MFIs. Out of 90 MFIs,
56 MFIs were licensed to mobilize public fimd as per their respective countries'
prudential regulations. All the MFIs samples from Costa Rica were deposit nontaking MFIs whereas all the MFIs sampled from Indonesia, Bangladesh and
Philippines were deposit taking MFIs. The average deposit per MFI was USD 227,
76,441.47. Even though all MFIs from Indonesia, Bangladesh and Philippines were
deposit taking, still Mexican MFIs topped in deposit mobilization (Table-1). The
average deposit as a percentage of assets of MFIs across the countries was about
52.10 per cent which means that a substantial capital of MFIs was generated from
deposits. The deposits of MFIs were 70.86 per cent of their portfolio. Mexican MFIs
again topped in securing the highest percentage of deposits to assets and gross loan
portfolio. The Indian and Nicaraguan MFIs had very less deposits as a percentage to
assets and gross loan portfolio (Table-2).
MFIs' borrowings as a percentage of assets was found highest in Nicaragua
(65.45 %) followed by India (64.24 %) and Costa Rica (57.62 %). Due to high
mobilization of public deposits, the Ecuadorian and Mexican MFIs had registered
very low borrowings as a percentage of assets i.e. 4.26 per cent and 4.69 per cent
respectively. The average borrowing as a percentage of assets of MFIs across the
countries was 21.13 per cent. Similar trend was observed in the borrowings as a
percentage of equities in MFIs and the average was 137.18 per cent indicating the
increasingly external borrowings of MFIs. The highest borrowings as percentage of
assets was observed for India (594.03 per cent) followed by Nicaragua (385.91),
Philippines (155.52 per cent), Bangladesh (154.98 per cent), Coast Rica (143.63 per
cent) and Indonesia (131.76 per cent) respectively. However, the least borrowings as
percentage of assets was observed in Ecuador (25.83 per cent) followed by Mexico
(31.58 per cent), indicating the ability of MFIs in these coimtries to generate capital
and less dependent on external borrowings. MFIs in India, Nicaragua, Philippines
and Costa Rica were found more dependent on external fundings.
Table 1: Means of Various Financial Items of MFIs
SI. Country
No

Sample Assets (USD)
Size

1 Indonesia
2 India
3 Bangladesh
4 Peru
5 Philippines
6 Ecuador
7 Costa Rica
8 Mexico
9 Nicaragua
Average
Standard Deviation

10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10

10,92,765.7
462,45,394.1
1622,00,618.1
768,78,485
97,73,100.5
133,06,270.2
58,27,965.2
1728,96,642.8
295,99,201.1
575,35,604.74
208,488,708.15

Jaipuria Institute of Management Lucknow

Borrowings
Gross Loan Equity
Deposits
(USD)
(USD)
PortfoUo
(USD)
(USD)
7,28,322.1
2,95,707.8 3,53,605.1 3,89,632.7
379,22,657.2 50,00,986
12,55,726.9 297,07,162.5
1101,60,930.7 220,49,396.9 648,10,063.4 341,73,013.2
63,61,5176.5 149,08,377.9 485,02,691.9 102,38,489.8
74,02,954.3 22,59,431.1 35,10,939
35,13,821.2
110,30,888.4 22,12,856
101,09,728 5,71,590.3
49,09,493.8
33,57,827.4
23,37,770.6 0
1220,67,279.7 256,92,348.4 1378,20,926.6 81,13,384.7
228,97,388.9 50,19,911.3 34,34,355.8 193,72,328.4
423,03,899.06 88,64,087.33 227,76,441.47 121,59,694.46
1463,40,990.57 28,379,502.03 1526,72319.90 356,12,167.77
Management Dynamics, VolumeJJ.Number 1 (2011)
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Table-2: Financial parameters ofMFIs across countries
SI.
No

Country

1
Indonesia
2
India
Bangladesh
3
4
Peru
Philippines
5
6
Ecuador
7
Costa Rica
8
Mexico
Nicaragua
9
Average

Sample Equity as Gross
Deposits Deposits Borrowings Borrowings
Loan
Size
as % of
%of
as % of as % of as % of
PortfoUo Assets
Gross
Equity
Assets
Assets
as a %
Loan
of Assets
Portfolio
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10

27.06
10.81
13.60
19.40
23.12
16.63
40.11
14.86
16.96
15.40

66.64
82.00
67.92
82.75
75.75
82.90
84.24
70.60
77.36
73.53

32.36
2.71
39.96
63.09
35.92
75.98
0
79.71
11.60
52.10

48.55
3.31
58.83
76.24
47.42
91.64
0
112.92
15.00
70.86

35.66
64.24
21.06
13.31
35.94
4.26
57.62
4.69
65.45
21.13

131.76
594.03
154.03
68.68
155.52
25.83
143.63
31.58
385.91
137.18

It had been observed that the average number of personnel per MFI was 979.24
with the highest of 6446.6 in Bangladesh, and the least in Costa Rica with 17.1
(Table-3). The high standard deviation reflects the presence of extreme values in the
data set. The average number of active borrowers was 201158.22 following the
previous trend i.e. the highest in Bangladesh with 1308740.2 and the least in Costa
Rica with 1146.2. This clearly reflects the highest personnel per MFI in Bangladesh
due to the highest active borrowers. The lowest personnel per MFIs in Costa Rica
were due to the least number of active borrowers. So the number of personnel per
MFI was related with the number of active borrowers per MFI as evident of high
correlation coefficient of 0.99. On an average 191619.24 nimiber of women
borrowers per MFI was observed with the highest in Bangladesh (1308740.2
numbers) and the least in Costa Rica. The inconsistency in the number of women
borrowers per MFI can be observed from the high standard deviation. The average
number of depositors per MFI was found tobe207878.58.
Table-3: Borrower, depositor and personnel status of MFIs
SI.
No

Country

Sample No. of
Size
Deposit
Taking
MFIs

1
2
3
4
5

Indonesia 10
India
10
Bangladesh 10
Peru
10
Philippines 10

Jaipuria Institute of Management Luchurw

10
3
10
7
10

Personnel
(Numbers)

Active
Borrowers
(Numbers)

Women
Borrowers
(Numbers)

Depositors
(Numbers)

50.2
858.8
6446.6
268.3
396.6

9014.4
264483
1308740.2
19231.9
65654.1

8216.6
243134.8
1308740.2
19231.9
64757.5

9032
29295.3
1541191
47515.2
68058
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SI.
No

Country

Sample No. of
Deposit
Size
Taking
MFIs

Personnel
(Numbers)

Active
Borrowers
(Numbers)

Women
Borrowers
(Numbers)

Depositors
(Numbers)

6
7
8
9

Ecuador
Costa Rica
Mexico
Nicaragua
Average

10
10
10
10
10

37.3
17.1
548.3
190
979.24
4506.27

2918.9
584.6
62488.4
14500.3
191619.24
940747.15

2918.9
584.6
62488.4
14500.3
191619.24
940747.15

13783.5
0
149992.8
12039.4
207878.58
1099402.10

SD

8
0
3
5
6.2

It has been found that the women borrowers as a percentage of active
borrowers was 96.55 per cent for deposit taking MFIs and 90.03 per cent for deposit
non-taking MFIs. This shows that the deposit taking MFIs were able to bring more
women borrowers in their book as compared to that of the deposit non-taking MFIs.
This outcome rejects the common belief that 'the deposit taking MFIs, often the
transformed MFIs, are the commercial ones, focus more on male borrowers than the
female borrowers'. In Bangladesh among the deposit taking MFIs, the women
borrowers as percentage to active borrowers was 100 per cent; and in Philippines and
India, it was 98.63 per cent and 97.06 respectively. Women borrowers as percentage
to active borrowers among the deposit non-taking MFIs was found the highest in
India (91.37 per cent) followed by Peru (87.88 per cent), Nicaragua (75.50 per cent)
and Mexico (72.18 per cent) respectively. From Table-4, it can be seen that the active
borrowers per persormel for deposit taldng MFIs was 198, and the same for deposit
non-taking MFIs was 265.91. It shows that the deposit taking MFIs better served the
clients. The least number of borrowers per personnel among the deposit taking MFIs
and deposit non-taking MFIs were located from Nicaragua (119.23) and Costa Rica
(67.02) respectively. India had the highest number of borrowers per personnel
among the deposit taking MFIs and deposit non-taking MFIs. Similar trend was
observed for women borrowers per personnel where the deposit taking MFIs had
191.13 women borrowers per personnel, and deposit non-t^dng MFIs had 239.41
women borrowers per persoimel. This again provided strong evidence of better
services to women members by deposit taking MFIs as compared to that of the
deposit non-taking MFIs. The least nimiber of women borrowers per persormel for
deposit taking MFIs was traced from Peru (69.06), and the same for deposit nontaking MFIs was found from Costa Rica (34.18). However, Indian deposit taking
MFIs and deposit non-taking MFIs recorded the highest number of women
borrowers per persormel.

Jaipuria Institute of Management Lucknow

Management Dynamics, VolumeJJ.Number 1 (2011)

Determinants OfTYansformation And Commercialization Of MFIs: Non- Experimental Findings

023

Table-4: Personnel per borrowers
SI.
No

Country

1
Indonesia
2
India
Bangladesh
3
4
Peru
Philippines
5
6
Ecuador
7
Costa Rica
8
Mexico
Nicaragua
9
Average

Borrowers as a
percentage of
Active Borrowers

Active
Borrowers/Personnel

Women Borrowers
per Personnel

Deposit
Taking
MFIs

Deposit
^on-taking
MFIs

Deposit
Taking
MFIs

Deposit
Non-taking
MFIs

Deposit
Taking
MFIs

Deposit
Non-taking
MFIs

91.15
97.06
100
51.46
98.63
54.08
nil
62.89
61.71
96.55

nil
91.37
nil
87.88
nil
63.71
51.00
72.18
75.50
90.03

179.57
280.18
204.00
134.33
165.54
143.29
nil
199.39
119.23
198

nil
311.35
nil
146.89
nil
153.35
67.02
83.90
106.41
265.91

163.68
271.95
204.00
69.06
163.28
77.49
nil
125.39
73.58
191.13

nil
284.47
nil
129.08
nil
97.71
34.18
60.56
80.34
239.41

The OLS estimates explaining how the size of employees in MFIs is
determined by nxomber of active borrowers, type of MFIs and amount of gross loan
portfolios, are presented in Table-5. It was found that size of active borrowers is
significantly and positively determined by the number of employees in MFIs. That
means if the nximber of active borrowers is more, then the number of employees in
MFIs increases significantly. The positive sign of the coefficient of 'Type of MFIs'
signifies the positive impact of this independent variable on the dependent variables,
but the impact of this independent variable as determinant of 'Number of Personnel
in MFIs' was foimd to be a weaker one (not significant). The increase in gross loan
portfolio leads to decrease in the number of employees in MFIs and vice-versa, but
this relationship also was found insignificant. This OLS model predicted 97 per cent
of the results as evidentfi-omthe adjusted R-square.
Table-5: OLS estimates explaining relationship of personnel with active borrowers,
type of MFIs and loan portfolios
Predictors

Coefficient

Standard Error

t-ratio

p-value

Dependent Variable; Number of Personnel in MFIs
Constant

-73.2529

123.920

-0.5911

0.5560

Number of
active borrowers

0.00476163

0.000100943

47.17

3.02e-063

Jaipuria Institute of Management Luchurw
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Predictors

Coefficient

Standard Error

t-ratio

p-value

"lype of MFIs
1 if deposit taking,
0 if deposit
non-t^ng

164.492

158.574

1.037

0.3025

-1.81880e-07

6.49265e-07

-0.2801

0.7800

Gross Loan
Portfolio
R-squared:
Adjusted R-squared:
Log-likelihood:

0.975258
0.974395
-717.9255

Table-6 shows a positive and significant impact of gross loan portfolio and
borrowings of MFIs on the number of women borrowers. If the gross loan portfolio
and borrowings of MFIs increase, then the nimiber of women borrowers in MFIs also
increases and vice-versa. This means if MFIs wish to increase the number of women
borrowers then they must increases the gross loan portfolio and borrowings.
However the prediction power of this OLS model is 50 per cent.
Table-6: OLS estimates explaining relationship of women borrowers with
Loan Portfolio and Borrowing
Items

Coefficient

Standard Error

t-ratio

p-value

Dependent Variable: Number of Women Borrowers
Constant

-58046.8

74602.8

-0.7781

0.4386

Gross Loan
Portfolio in USD

0.00204411

0.000544360

3.755

0.0003

Borrowings
of MFIs in USD

0.0134824

0.00223694

6.027

3.92e-08 *•»

' Correlation Matrix among Loan Portfolio, Type of MFIs and Active Borrowers
Loan Portfolio Active Borrower
TypeofMFI
1.0000
0.5875
0.1488 Loan Portfolio
1.0000
0.1049 Active Borrower
1.0000 TVpe ofMFI
' Correlation (Loan Portfolio, Borrowings) = 0.47070841
MFIs in USD
R-squared:
Adjusted R-squared:
Log-likelihood:

0.514377
0.503213
-1332.596
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The Probit estimate results presented in Table-7 show that the probability of
transformation of an MFI from deposit non-taking to deposit taking is significantly
determined by Loan Portfolio and borrowings. Evidence of positive relationship
between probability of transformation of MFIs and gross loan portfolio (positive
coefficient); and negative relationship between probability of transformation of
MFIs and external borrowing was found out. More the gross loan portfolio, more is
the probability of transformation; and more the external borrowing, less is the
probability of transformation of MFIs. A weak evidence of impact of number
borrowers on the probability of transformation of MFIs was traced out from the
Probit results. However, increases in the number of women borrowers in MFIs lead to
less probability of transformation (since the coefficient is negative) but it was found
insignificant.
Table-7: Probit Estimates on Probability of Transformation as a function of
loan portfolio, borrowings and women borrowers
Items

Coeflicient

Standard Error

t-ratio

p-value

Dependent Variable; Type of MFIs; dummy variable, 1 if deposit taking and,
0 if deposit not taking
Constant

0.220436

0.153391

1.437

0.1507

Loan
Portfolio in USD

6.77354e-08

3.89385e-08

1.740

0.0819 *

Borrowings USD

-8.61625e-08

4.50680e-08

-1.912

0.0559 *

Women Borrowers
(Nos)

-1.52394e-06

1.40370e-06

-1.086

0.2776

Adjusted R-squared: 0. 42982, Log-likelihood : -53.10234

From Table-8, it can be observed that the assets and number of active
borrowers remained as strong determinants of probability of transformation of MFIs.
If the assets of MFIs are more, then MFIs are more likely to be transformed from
deposit non-taking to deposit taking due to the positive coefficient. But if the
numbers of active borrowers are more, then the MFIs have less probability of
transforming from non-deposit taking to deposit taking. The prediction capability of
this Probit model presented in Table-8 is 74 per cent as explained by the adjusted Rsquare.

Table-8: Probit Estimates on Probability of Transformation as a function
of assets, borrowings and active borrowers
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Items

Coefficient

Standard Error

t-ratio

p-value

Dependent Variable: Type of MFIs; dummy variable, 1 if deposit taking and, 0 if deposit not taking
Constant

0.11441

0.162171

0.7055

0.4805

Assets (USD)
Borrowings USD

1.38979e-07

5.04206e-08

2.756

0.0058

-2.09036C-07

7.46080e-08

-2.802

0.0051 ***

-3.53222e-06

1.80383e-06

-1.958

0.0502 •

Active Borrowers
(Nos)

Adjusted R-squared 0.7444, Log-likelihood

-48.65942

CONCLUSION
The study fomid higher employees strength in deposit taking MFIs than nondeposit taking MFIs. The size of personnel in MFIs was positively and significantly
determined by the number of active borrowers. So MFIs must increase their
employee strength if they wish to serve large niunber of clients. This study rejects the
common belief "MFIs transform from non-deposit taking organizations to deposit
taking organizations with a motive to achieve higher financial performance, and
leave behind the social performance". However the study concluded that MFIs
undergo transformation into different deposit taking legal entities from their original
NGO status to increase the gross loan portfolio and external borrowings with a
motive to serve more women clients. Lesser dependency of MFIs on external
borrowings makes them operate in a sustainable way. The probability of
transformation of MFIs is more if the amount of external borrowings and the number
of active borrowers are less.
Finally the study rejects the traditional belief of the existence of trade-off
between social and ^ancial performance between transformed deposit-taking
MFIs. To serve an increased number of borrowers in a sustainable manner, the NGObased MFIs should transform themselves into deposit taking commercialized
financial institutions. Further, this study encourages in-depth researches on the tradeoff between mission drift and social performance of MFIs using a broad set of social
and financial indicators.
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